I recently wrote a first version of a new working paper entitled « Waiting for the Prince Charming: Fixed-Term Contracts as Stopgaps ». You can download it here, see the replication code on the associated GitHub repository or directly test it through MyBinder. It provides insights on the already well-known consequences of labor market dualism on unemployment and welfare. In particular, labor market dynamics following employment protection legislation reforms are considered. The theoretical possibility to explain the resort to both fixed-term and open-ended contracts using random search models à-la Mortensen-Pissarides is assessed as well. Here is the abstract
Abstract:
In
this paper, I build a simple Mortensen-Pissarides model embedding a
dual labor market. I derive conditions for the existence of an
equilibrium with coexisting strongly protected open-ended contracts and
exogeneously short fixed-term contracts. I also study dynamics after a
reform on employment protection legislation. Temporary contracts play
the role of fillers while permanent contracts are used to lock up
high-productivity matches. High firing costs favor the emergence of a
dual equilibrium. Employment protection legislation encourages the
resort to temporary employment in job creation. This scheme is
intertwined with a general-equilibrium effect: permanent contracts
represent the bulk of employed workers and a more stringent employment
protection reduces aggregate job destruction. This pushes down
unemployment and in turn reduces job creation flows through temporary
contracts. The model is calibrated to match the French labor market.
Policy experiments demonstrate that there is no joint gain in employment
and social welfare through reforms on firing costs around the baseline
economy. The optimal policy consists in implementing a unique open-ended
contract with a strong cut in firing costs. Increases in firing costs
within a dual labor market lead to a sluggish adjustment, while large
cuts in firing costs lead to a quick one. The adjustment time of the
labor market is highly non-monotonous between these two extremes.
Policy-related uncertainty significantly strengthens fixed-term
employment on behalf of open-ended employment. Considering extensions, I
draw conclusions on the inability of a large class of random-matching
models to mimic the distribution of temporary contracts’ duration while
maintaining possible the expiring temporary contracts’ conversion into
permanent contracts.
